

RESTRICTED

Assistant Director, R & E

9 September 1948

Chief, Staff Intelligence Group

Relationship between ORE and the State-Army-Navy-Air Force
Coordinating Committee

- REFERENCES:
- a. CIG Directive No. 17 dated 5 December 1946 (Restricted)
 - b. CIA Administrative Instruction 50-7 dated 22 January 1947 (Restricted)
 - c. ORE Instruction No. 25-47 (renumbered 18-48) dated 23 May 1947 (Restricted)
 - d. ORE Operating Procedure No. 1 dated 6 August 1948 (Restricted)
 - e. SANACC Memorandum for Information No. 137 dated 24 August 1948 (Unclassified)

1. Reference a sets forth the policy and reference b the procedure governing the relationship between the CIA and the SANACC. Reference c, based on references a and b, sets forth the relationship between ORE and SANACC.

2. Reference d canceled reference c thereby leaving no ORE directive governing ORE-SANACC relations. To my knowledge, though in part inapplicable, references a and b are still in force.

3. The procedures devised for CIA-SANACC relations, at least insofar as they related to ORE, were never practical. Shortly after a spurt of activity by ORE in commenting on an extensive SANACC report a year ago, operational contact with SANACC has practically ceased. This can be attributed in part to uncertainty in policies followed by the front office which discouraged active efforts of the SANACC Secretariat at cooperation. A more important factor, however, has been the level at which the working contacts between ORE branches and SANACC were established. The designation of regional branch chiefs as operational contacts with SANACC regional subcommittees was based on false assumptions; namely, that SANACC Subcommittee met frequently, and that the subcommittee level was the proper level at which to make available to SANACC any intelligence support from CIA. In fact, the SANACC subcommittees seldom meet but transact their business by means of voting slips. By the time a paper has cleared the drafting or working group, intelligence necessary to the paper has already been incorporated and it is too late to do anything except possibly make comment, in which case there is great reluctance to change anything but gross errors.

4. The advent of NSC was known to presage a diminution of SANACC responsibility and authority; even the doing away with SANACC altogether for some time existed as a possibility. Meanwhile, reference e,